Rise of the Pakistan Taliban
Executive Summary
The rise of militant Islam in Pakistan ranks among countless examples of short-term political gain sacrificing long-term stability. In the 70s, the Zia government manipulated religious symbols in order to raise a holy army and shore up its own domestic support. However, after the war against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan ended, militant Islam could not be sealed away. Now in the year 2009, the Pakistani state is fighting for its survival against Islamic militias borne of the Taliban’s ideology.
The Rise of General Zia
The Pakistani state has always been tied to Islam. It is, after all, originally a homeland for the Muslims of colonial India. Up until the 1970s, Pakistan’s Islamic identity was able to co-exist relatively peacefully with secular politics. However, a coup in 1977 began a process that would eventually change the complexion of Islam in Pakistan, transforming it from a moderate interpretation to the militant version that is now rising to challenge the state.
In 1977, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq seized power in Islamabad, overthrowing the democratically elected government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. After taking power, General Zia, a staunch Islamist and anti-communist, found himself presiding over a government that had no constitutional mandate to rule [2]. Furthermore, large portions of the population continued to support the deposed President Bhutto and his Pakistani People’s Party (PPP).To overcome this deficit in popular support, General Zia adopted two strategies that still resonate in present day Pakistani politics: relying on the military to prop up his regime and the manipulation of Islamic symbols for political ends [1, 2].
The Mujahideen in Afghanistan
In 1978, a coup in Afghanistan brought the Soviet-backed People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) into power. To the Zia government, the PDPA represented both an external threat from the Soviet Union as well as the potential for internal subversion from ethnic Balochs, Pashtuns living along the Durand line, and leftist PPP members [1]. In response to these threats, the Zia government began to organize and train disparate Afghan ethnic groups under the inclusive flag of Islam, a strategy that was facilitated by the ‘godless’ nature of the Soviet-backed PDPA regime. Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had even occurred, several Mujahideen training camps existed in Pakistan [3]. Most of these camps were located in the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP) and federally administered Tribal Areas (FATA), two regions where the present-day Taliban’s hold is strongest [1].
When the Soviets eventually invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) responded by intensifying efforts to organize Afghan partisans in Pakistani training camps [3]. The period from 1979-1989 was marked by the establishment of an intricate indoctrination and training system for Mujahideen fighters in Pakistan, lubricated by U.S. aid, and comprised of a network of madrassas and training camps situated along the Durand line and beyond [1, 2]. In the end, General Zia’s strategy of championing Islam to secure his shaky regime was successful, though it came at a cost of blurring the line between civilian and military rule and the creation of a network devoted to the propagation of radical Islam.
Pakistan support for the Taliban in the Afghan civil war
After the unifying symbol of the Soviet army withdrew from Afghanistan, the ethnic and religious groups that made up the Mujahideen began to fracture, eventually plunging Afghanistan into civil war. The Pakistani government’s patron of choice during this time came to be the Taliban. Their reasons were as follows:
- The Taliban were Sunni and had educational and training links to Pakistan’s Mujahideen infrastructure. They could be used to counter Indian or Iranian influenced ethnic groups such as the Hazara, thus avoiding the persistent danger of Indian encirclement [1, 4].
- The Taliban were rivals to the Jamaat-e-Islami, a faction that Benazir Bhutto believed was complicit in her father’s execution [6].
- A sympathetic Taliban government in Kabul was not likely to press Pakistan on the Durand line or pan-Pashtun nationalism [4].
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban ended abruptly after September 11th, 2001, a policy reversal that, while precipitated by geopolitical necessity, also had the effect of driving a wedge into Pakistani society by alienating sections of the population who lamented the abandonment of their Islamic brothers in Afghanistan.
The Taliban movement turns on the Pakistani state
From 2001 onwards, militants flooded across the Pakistani border into Afghanistan to launch attacks against coalition forces. By 2007 however, things began to change and the Taliban instead embarked on a violent campaign within Pakistan targeted at state institutions [4]. The reason for their shift in emphasis is likely twofold.
First, when fighting a guerilla war, it is reasonable and expected to fall back across the porous Durand line to re-group far from the reach of coalition troops. The second and far more important reason concerns the Taliban’s identity and goals. At some point during the civil war in Afghanistan, the Taliban became detached from Afghan nationalism and adopted the mantle of a wider religious movement [1]. Around this time, Mullah Omar started identifying himself as the ‘Commander of the Faithful’ [1]. This identity shift resulted in the Taliban starting to look beyond Kabul and set their sights on ‘infidels’ in the wider Muslim world and beyond.
Thus, the emergence of native Taliban movements in Pakistan should come as no surprise. They are the result of post-Zia ‘Islamisation’ of Pakistan, the spiritual appeal of the Taliban’s brand of Wahabism, anti-American sentiment, and finally popular disillusionment towards a Pakistani government that fails to provide basic services or job opportunities [1, 5, 3].
The ‘Pakistan Taliban’
Islamist groups operating in Pakistan are primarily based in the FATA or the NWFP regions, areas where government control is tenuous at best. From 2001 onward, the Pakistani government’s strategy to counter ‘Talibanisation’ has rotated between launching disastrous military campaigns and brokering peace deals that exchange Sharia law and prisoners for a ceasefire [4]. A few of the major groups:
- Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): An umbrella organization of homegrown Taliban groups in Pakistan, the TTP was at one point said to control seven agencies of the FATA and seven districts of the Malakand Division [6]. The group was headed by Baitullah Mehsud, believed to be behind the Benazir Bhutto assassination and recently reported killed by a US drone strike in the FATA [8].
- Tehreek Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM): Sufi Muhammad, leader of the TNSM, brokered the abortive 2009 Sharia-for-peace deal in Swat. TNSM goals call for the establishment of Sharia law throughout Pakistan [9].
Terrorist attacks in Pakistan
Terrorist violence is trending upwards in Pakistan. In 2003, terrorism was behind 164 civilian and security forces deaths. By 2008, the number had risen to 2,809 [7]. Attacks are predominantly targeted at state personnel and institutions. For example, after government forces stormed the pro-Taliban LaL Masjid in 2007, local Taliban groups in the NWFP attacked a government office and killed thirteen people [4]. While the attacks are too numerous to list, most of them share the common goal of undermining state authority.
Islamabad’s challenge moving forward
Taliban influence continues to fill the vacuum left by weak state institutions in the FATA and NWFP, and if the state remains compromised, ‘Talibanisation’ could make inroads into the ‘settled’ areas of Pakistan. Therefore, it follows that the key to reversing encroaching Taliban influence is to strengthen the legitimacy and institutions of the Pakistani state.
This is no easy task, for the Pakistani government remains torn between domestic and international obligations. Support for U.S. foreign policy ventures costs valuable political support at home. Moreover, economic crisis in Pakistan has made it even harder for the government to provide basic services. Apathy is widespread in Pakistan. Citizens are loath to choose between a government perceived to be an American puppet in Islamabad and fundamentalist Taliban groups in the frontier provinces [4].
However, there are signs that the Pakistani government has turned a corner in their fight against Islamic militancy. The breakdown of the 2009 Swat deal and subsequent issuance of an arrest warrant for TNSM leader Sufi Muhammad indicate that, at least for the time being, Islamabad is no longer willing to pursue an appeasement policy.
Zachary Fillingham is a contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com
Sources:
[1] Hussain, R. Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan. Hampshire, England. Ashgate Publishing Limited. 2005.PAKISTAN'S "WAR ON TERRORISM"
FINALLY, Pakistan has declared its own ‘war on terrorism’. The North Waziristan operation, the prime minister’s pronouncements and the adoption of the Protection of Pakistan Bill by the National Assembly are significant signals of serious intent to rid the country of the terrorist menace.
To succeed, the government will have to plan and pursue a comprehensive strategy and utilise all relevant instruments of state power — military, police, intelligence, diplomatic and economic.
The North Waziristan operation was long in coming. The political reticence was overcome by the failure of the talks with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its relentless acts of terrorism. The attack on the Karachi airport was the final straw.
The North Waziristan operation is unlikely to be fully successful since it lacked the vital element of surprise. Most of the militants, it must be presumed, have slipped out of the agency. Even so, the military operation will disrupt the militant groups that are affiliated with the TTP and cleanse the epicentre of anti-Pakistan terrorism.
However, the presumed dispersal of the motley group of TTP militants will require the elimination of their external (Afghan) safe havens and their ‘internal’ hideouts within Pakistan. Both objectives are challenging.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif rightly, if belatedly, requested Afghan President Hamid Karzai to seal the escape routes from North Waziristan into Afghanistan. Given the known and self-declared support given by Afghan Intelligence to elements of the TTP and the safe haven provided to Mullah Fazlullah, the current TTP ‘leader’, Karzai’s unhelpful response was not surprising.
To eliminate the Afghan safe havens, and end the support to the TTP and the so-called Balochistan Liberation Army from Afghan (and Indian) intelligence, Pakistan might find itself considering both soft and hard options.
Like Washington, Pakistan can hope that Afghanistan’s next president will be more helpful than Karzai. Pakistan can reciprocate Kabul’s cooperation by using its presumed ‘influence’ with the Afghan Taliban to promote reconciliation within Afghanistan. Unfortunately, if the Afghan election ends in controversy and crystallizes that country’s ethnic and regional divisions, the likelihood of any cooperation from Kabul to eliminate the TTP’s safe havens will recede further.
Failing to secure such cooperation, Pakistan could press the United States to use its vaunted drones to attack the TTP safe havens inside Afghanistan. This would be an acid test of America’s sincerity in combating all terrorists. If such US action is not forthcoming, a much harder option might be considered: Pakistan’s acquisition of armed drones (from China) to target the TTP’s safe havens in Afghanistan.
Since elements of the TTP consist of Uzbeks and Chechens, who also threaten Russia and Central Asia, and Uighurs, who threaten China, Pakistani authorities might seek support from Moscow and Beijing — both military and political — to eliminate the TTP safe havens. (Collaboration with Moscow and Beijing may also be useful in promoting internal reconciliation within Afghanistan.)
Eliminating the TTP’s ‘havens’ in Pakistan will be equally if not more difficult. A priority aim must be to smoke out the TTP terrorists from their hideouts in Karachi. Further terrorist attacks like the one on the airport in Karachi could stifle all chances of investment and economic revival in Pakistan.
A second priority should be to neutralise the Punjabi Taliban. This will need bold decisions by the ruling party, some of whose members have well-known political links with sectarian groups. These groups should be pressed to break with the TTP and renounce terrorist violence or suffer the consequences of security action by the state.
Among the Pakistani groups, the Lashkar-i-Taiba has a unique position. It is not a part of the TTP. Its agenda is pro-Kashmir and anti-Indian. A dialogue can be attempted with the LeT to dissuade it from embarking on adventures, like Mumbai, which do not serve the larger interests of the Kashmiris, the Indian Muslims or Pakistan. It should be encouraged to pursue its agenda through political means.
Combating terrorism in Fata and adjacent areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa will involve winning over insurgent factions, such as the Sajna group, and tribal leaders, through a combination of incentives and disincentives. The incentives could include: provision of speedy justice, electricity, health services and education, political representation, monetary rewards and job creation, especially through infrastructure projects. A parallel endeavour is essential in Balochistan.
Halting terrorist financing is crucial. All the three main sources of such financing need to be addressed: criminal activities, such as kidnapping and drugs; contributions from religious zealots, both foreign and domestic, and money supplied by hostile foreign agencies and governments. With a determined, honest and intelligent effort, most if not all terrorist financing can be controlled.
Success in the counterterrorism campaign will depend considerably on effective intelligence and police functions. Existing structures are not up to the task. One or more special units, equipped with honest and qualified personnel, modern investigative and operational capabilities, and the intimate involvement of the armed forces and the intelligence agencies, will need to be created to address the multi-dimensional objectives of the counter-terrorist campaign.
It also seems essential to create an apex body, similar to the Nuclear Command Authority, where the political, armed forces, intelligence and diplomatic leadership can jointly formulate and oversee the execution of an agreed national counterterrorism strategy.
Ultimately, Pakistan’s ‘war on terrorism’ will be won only if it addresses and resolves the root causes of extremism and terrorism in the country: poverty, unemployment, injustice, inequality, ignorance and the erosion of tolerance, decency, humanity and nationalism within our society and polity.
This will be a long ‘war’. It will entail suffering and sacrifice. But it is a war worth fighting to achieve peace and prosperity for Pakistan’s 200 million people and to reclaim the soul of the country that was created by Pakistan’s founding fathers.
The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.
Published in Dawn, July 6th, 2014
